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The late Christopher Lasch's last book, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of
Democracy, was, as he put it, "written under trying circumstances". Trying, indeed: he died of
cancer a few days after completing the manuscript, in February 1994, at the age of sixty-one.
Lasch was one of America's most important cultural critics. A quiet, self-effacing historian at
a small university in upstate New York, he will certainly not be forgotten by those concerned
about the excessive power of bureaucratic elites, the so-called "New Class" of technocratic
managers and bureaucrats.
Lasch's work was ridiculed by liberal critics (the political theorist Stephen Holmes and his
book The Anatomy of Anti-Liberalism, 1993, particularly come to mind) as a tiresome
jeremiad, a tendentious mish-mash of illiberalism, anti-modernism and nostalgia. In the eyes
of these critics, Lasch attacked chimeras, largely by failing to locate his critique within
ahistorical liberal political theory, the endlessly recycled rights and contract theories which
are predominant in the American academy. John Gray has in these pages (eg, April 28,
1995) and elsewhere identified the shortcomings of American rights-dominated liberal
theorists. Their especially tendentious trait is the assumption that anyone who does not
share their vision of the welfare state and bureaucracy must be illiberal.
Lasch's methodology was intellectual hist-ory. He, like Isaiah Berlin, found it a surer
approach than analytic political philosophy, because intellectual history accepts cultural and
historical contingencies that political theory seeks to suppress in its quest for timelessness.
Lasch's second book, The New Radicalism in America, 18891963: The intellectual as a
social type (1965, reissued in 1986), is an example of this methodology. The book identifies
the foundations of that special American radicalism, the radicalism of social work, of the
"helping professions", which, far more than any "left" or "socialist" ideology, produced today's
specifically American welfare state. These themes emerge in Lasch's mid-career study of
inter-ference in the family by social workers during the twentieth century, Haven in a
Heartless World: The family besieged (1977, reissued in 1995).
This critique of the administrative state and the elaborate structures of narcissistic,
consumerist individualism necessary to sustain it elaborated in these and other books into an
attack on contemporary American liberalism had to be rejected by liberal apologists, if only
because it is axiomatic in contemporary liberal theory that liberalism is complete and selfsustaining. Liberalism is, in the ambitions of its American theorists especially, a priori
"provable" as the end to which rational people aspire. This view cannot tolerate anyone who
suggests that not only is liberalism not rational, but that as a social practice, distinguished
from political theory, it exists by scavenging off older, traditional forms of social life. Far from
being self-sustaining, Lasch taught, liberalism even the attractive parts such as democracy

and freedom is fragile. It is always dependent on social and cultural forms that disappear in a
historical flash, no matter how much political theory is adduced to "prove" its rationality.
Of those forms of social life, none is more important (and, one is strongly tempted to say,
none consequently more deliberately ignored) than the family. But it occupies no substantive
place in any contractarian liberal theory. At best, it is just another contingent social formation
in civil society or, ominously, a creature of the state. More precisely, conceiving the family as
just another contingent social unit makes it available to be colonized by the state; each
conception serves the other, mutually reinforcing. But whether it is seen as a contingent
social unit or a state institution (with parents as the mere agents of production of more
deracinated, "free" individuals), in any case it has no independent weight of its own within
liberal theory, no unique theoretical place from which it might resist falling victim to either the
capitalist market or the state or, in American society today, to both.
Lasch perceived, however (and this should serve as a warning to anyone not hopelessly
trapped within the closed circle of liberalism), that the family is "besieged". And if it goes the
way mapped out by therapeutic interventions aimed at it in this century, it will take with it the
very possibility of a certain form of liberalism. What is threatened, or perhaps already lost, is
not the bureaucratic authoritarianism with a thin veneer of democratic legitimacy that passes
for "liberalism" in the United States, but a liberalism that could have been vastly more
attractive and to which Lasch himself subscribed.
Lasch's liberal critics naturally derided something as gauche as the family as a subject of
political theory. His more perceptive conservative readers, however, who might have been
expected to embrace someone who defended the traditional family as an unexpected
convert, also kept a wary distance. Thoughtful conservative reviewers of Revolt of the Elites,
for example, understood that Lasch had remained true to his radical-left roots. All he had
done was to draw logical conclusions, as he saw them, about the calamitous effects of an
ever bolder capitalism on ordinary American life. That these conclusions were sometimes
culturally "traditional" or anti-statist did not make him a conservative. Daniel J. Silver, in the
American Spectator (May 1995), for example, wrote accurately that "Lasch identifies free
enterprise itself, the restless, relentless force of capitalist markets, as the prime culprit".
By the end of his life, Lasch announced himself not as a conservative, but as a populist,
which in America has traditionally come in both right and left varieties. Lasch notes
approvingly in Revolt of the Elites that populism "is rooted in the defense of small
proprietorship, which was widely regarded, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
as the necessary basis of civic virtue". Indeed, Lasch's summing up of his later views, The
True and Only Heaven: Progress and its critics (1991), defends the morality of the petty
bourgeoisie the inheritors of the class and traditions of the small proprietors - against their
putative cultural betters. This lower-middle-class moral tradition, Lasch says, is nothing
startling, and amounts to its appreciation of the moral value of honest work, its respect for
competence, its egalitarian opposition to entrenched privilege, its refusal to be impressed by
the jargon of experts, its insistence on plain speech and on holding people accountable for
their actions.
Lasch does not ignore the unsavoury side of populism. "It would be foolish", he writes, "to
deny the characteristic features of popular movements at their worst racism, anti-Semitism,
nativism, anti-intellectualism, and all the other evils so often cited by liberal critics." Still, he
maintains, "a movement that offers any real hope for the future will have to find much of its
moral inspiration in the plebian radicalism of the past and more generally in the indictment of
progress, large-scale production, and bureaucracy".

Lasch sets himself against the ideology of "progress" ultimately because progress is
incompatible with the idea of limits, either natural or moral. It therefore leads not just to silly
forms of utopianism, but to dangerous ones as well. The petty bourgeoisie, Lasch believes,
are or were inoculated by their experience against such perfectionism, at least in its secular
forms. This is simultaneously an attraction of the philosophy of this class and a reason why
its cultured detractors include those elites for whom the commitment to secular progress is
essential because, in the Western intellectual tradition, progress is mobility.
Lasch stresses, however, the positive side of this petty-bourgeois project. In the place of
progress, Lasch says, the lower-middle class traditionally embraced the virtue of hope, a
virtue precisely because it arises out of a recognition of limits. For those, this reviewer
included, who reject today's liberal progressivism because it is essentially immodest, Lasch's
rejection of progress in favour of hope generated by an acceptance of limits is enormously
appealing. It strongly recalls (though Lasch, the staunch Americanist, does not say so) the
liberal modesty, moderation and limits that Camus urged at the end of L'Homme revolte.
But Lasch also observes that the lower-middle class only residually possesses this moral
tradition today. This is because it has been dispossessed of the material basis of those
traditions by changes in capitalism itself. Indeed, Lasch's telling discussion of differences
between populism and the current intellectual fashion of communitarianism in Revolt of the
Elites implies that whereas populism is rooted in a form of material production, today's
communitarianism is rooted in no particular material tradition, no class and no particular way
of making a living. It is essentially a creation of intellectuals now to be bestowed on society.
This explains in large measure why contemporary communitarianism carries with it a fatal
nostalgia which can be finally overcome, but only by an equally fatal sensibility that
"community" can be created out of anything, a kind of optimism that shares in the worst
features of "progress". The "community" of communitarianism is psychological, if not utterly
"virtual"; otherwise (and still more of the time), it is statist in the strongest possible way. Neil
Kinnock is reported to have asked rhetorically in a speech, "Why can't the state be our
community?" Kinnock's question deserves a serious answer. Still, the difference between
community and state, one might have thought, is a difference communitarianism should exist
to assert. Either way, virtual or statist, these are mere simulacra of community.
The failure of communitarians, however, to get to "real" community is not mere foolishness. It
is largely the consequence of an intellectual movement possessing no organic base except
its own sociological analysis and a desire to translate this analysis into feelings, and then into
social practices to reproduce those feelings. Populism, by contrast, is a sensibility inculcated
into a class over a long period of time by a form of production.
Inevitably, however, Lasch's steadfast indictment of the dislocations of capitalism clashed
with the ideology of those who gained most from capitalism's mobility women of the upper
bourgeoisie especially, the minority of women lucky enough to prosper, by reason of
education or social class, from the loosening of patriarchal restrictions on their participation
in the economy. He did not help matters by entertaining, during what might be called his own
statist phase, wild suggestions on ways the state could defend the family ideas such as
sharply restricting the availability of divorce and separation in law. Those ideas inevitably had
their strongest effects on women's mobility; unsurprisingly, even many of Lasch's
sympathetic readers were less than enthusiastic.
Yet Lasch also clashed with another strand of the women's movement, the strand
representing the tradition of Jane Addams, the radicalism of the helping professions. They,

and the rest of American "progressives", virtually disowned Lasch when arguably his most
important work, Haven in a Heartless World, appeared in 1977. The left correctly understood
it to be an assault on the foundations of the social-worker state into which they, late of the
New Left, were then comfortably settling. Lasch accused them of betraying their leftist origins
in favour of a modus vivendi with consumer capitalism which required increasingly
authoritarian state structures to hold it in check, owing to the excesses to which it pushed
individuals seeking pleasure and the inevitable tolls it exacted from family and local
community life. They, the former left, graduated from university and then eagerly sought jobs
as therapeutic cops in the new bureaucracies.
Lasch shows in Haven in a Heartless World that today's social-worker class is armed with
immense administrative, judicial and law enforcement tools by which to re-organize family life
after having dismantled, in conjunction with consumer capitalism, the structures of extended
family, neighbourhood and religious life of an earlier society. Lasch is moreover insistent that
this breakdown of traditional social structures is the product of human agency, not of abstract
social "forces" . . . the family did not simply evolve in response to social and economic
influences; it was deliberately transformed by the intervention of planners and policymakers.
Today's helping professions thus stand in an unbroken and inglorious line with social
workers of the early twentieth century; the lesson Lasch draws from this across all his books
is that a radicalism did triumph in the United States. But it was not the radicalism of Marx or
any kind of socialism. Instead, what triumphed was the radicalism of the helping professions,
transforming the state into the engine of therapy. Because the no longer surprising fact is
that therapy and bureaucracy have considerable affinity; each seeks rationalization, each is
hierarchical and, above all, each is authoritarian.
The radicalism of the helping professions, early in the century as now, relies on metaphors
from medicine and psychology. Society is a sick patient which must be treated. But its
constituent elements are psychological rather than political the family rather than the classes
to which families belong. In the view of the early twentieth-century reformers, the family
generally and the immigrant family in particular were institutions entirely too private to serve
the needs of society and the state, and hence had to be supplanted. "There is no more
brilliant hope on earth today", wrote Charlotte Perkins Gilmore in 1903, for example, than
"the recognition of 'the child' . . . with rights to be guaranteed only by the state".
These were frightening words to parents Lasch quotes repeatedly and to great effect the
poignant words of immigrant parents addressed in vain to early child welfare agencies that
had "rescued" children from their parents. Yet this and many similar remarks by the early
reformers could and sometimes practically have been penned by the helping professionals
today, or, Lasch points out, by Hillary Rodham Clinton. She, he observes, like those earlier
reformers, criticizes the "decision makers' (ie, judges') extreme reluctance to interrupt family
life" and calls for a "theory that adequately explains the state's appropriate role in child
rearing". Although she warns that the state's authority must be "exercised only in warranted
cases", her writings leave the unmistakable impression that it is the family that holds children
back, the state that sets them free.
Parents in her view amount at best to minor civil servants, answerable to the state and
simply part of its bureaucracy.
What, then, does Lasch think "besieges" the family? The answer is straightforward: the New
Class. Lasch, by the end of his life and especially in Revolt of the Elites and The True and

Only Heaven, identified himself as a populist against this New Class; he was finally neither
conservative nor communitarian.
Much that Lasch wrote is, in fact, pedestrianly communitarian. He repeatedly identified
rampant individualism, consumerism, the "culture of narcissism", and liberalism's deracinated
and unconstrained individuals as causes of contemporary American woes. His two bestknown books, The Culture of Narcissism (1979) and The Minimal Self (1984), are full of such
language, yet they are simultaneously his worst books and least faithful to his final
philosophy. In this middle period of his writing, which produced these two works, he also
walked into the communitarian trap of statism, and the belief that morality in America could
be rejuvenated through politics, from the top down, from the presidential pulpit.
He thus wound up advising President Jimmy Carter on his deservedly disastrous "national
malaise" speech; the experience, however, apparently taught Lasch that communitarian
statism put the cart of "rampant individualism" before the horse of New Class bureaucracy,
state and consumer capitalism. By the time he wrote The True and Only Heaven and Revolt
of the Elites, Lasch had reordered his targets in such a way that he could no longer be
counted as a member of the communitarian camp.
He understood that democracy required considerable public virtues. He also understood,
however, that those virtues would be forged in the crucible of the family and the loci of real
communities, in extended family, neighbourhood, workplace and church, or nowhere at all.
The communitarians who today think they can forge morality from above, in political
orderings, and who therefore applaud Bob Dole's railing against Hollywood or Bill Clinton's
preaching against pregnancy to black teenage girls, fail to understand that community can
only be realized by pushing aside both state and capital, to allow communities to reformulate
themselves, if indeed they will and along such lines as they will. The one certainty about
those communities, however, is that their particularities will not be pleasing to New Class
social engineers.
This by no means rejects the role of elites in society. Lasch insisted, rather, that in order for
elites to exercise leadership, they must be rooted in the communities they would lead. The
great warning of Revolt of the Elites is how the New Class in America is discovering that they
have more in common with others in similar situations across the world than they have with
the lower orders of their own society.
The New Class pushes its mobility to absolute limits, launching itself into a global society
conducted in the jet stream, made weightless by the complete mobility of capital, but with
devastating consequences for those left behind on the ground. The trope of Lasch's title
plays on Ortega y Gasset's famous claim in the 1930s of the revolt of the masses; ironically
today it is the elites, those who, Lasch insists, should lead society, who are in revolt against
even that modest restriction on their mobility and claim on their allegiance.
Lasch, for his part, was clear by the end of his life that the problem of the breakdown of the
family, from which he started his analysis and for which his courage ought to be honoured, is
not "rampant individualism" as, for example, the communitarians see it. It is instead
authoritarianism, the peculiar form of authoritarianism emerging from the conjunction of state
and therapy, finding its justification in controlling but perversely requiring the existence of
rampant, predatory individualism. Having weakened the self-direction and self-control
possible in family and local communities, the state, he warns in the closing words of Haven
in a Heartless World, has undermined one of the principal sources of social cohesion, only to

create new ones more constricting than the old, and ultimately more devastating in their
impact on personal and political freedom.
Was Lasch a libertarian? He was, at least, an anti-statist and anti-capitalist. The idea must
seem strange to those who know only The Culture of Narcissism and The Minimal Self;
certainly there is no shortage of his work which runs the other way. But his plea to reassert
hope in place of New Class "progress", and his plea for a philosophy of limits, are evidence
that at the heart of Christopher Lasch's philosophy was the rescue of human freedom from
the dead-end of bureaucracy and capital in which contemporary liberalism has stranded it.
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